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Abstract—Interference in wireless networks degrades the sig-
nal quality at the terminals. However, it can potentially enhance
the secrecy rate. This paper investigates the secrecy rate in a
two-user interference network where one of the users, namely
user 1, requires to establish a confidential connection. User 1
wants to prevent an unintended user of the network to decode
its transmission. User 1 has to transmit such that its secrecy rate
is maximized while the quality of service at the destination of the
other user, user 2, is satisfied, and both user’s power limits are
taken into account. We consider two scenarios: 1) user 2 changes
its power in favor of user 1, an altruistic scenario, 2) user 2 is
selfish and only aims to maintain the minimum quality of service
at its destination, an egoistic scenario. It is shown that there
is a threshold for user 2’s transmission power that only below
or above which, depending on the channel qualities, user 1 can
achieve a positive secrecy rate. Closed-form solutions are obtained
in order to perform joint optimal power control. Further, a
new metric called secrecy energy efficiency is introduced. We
show that in general, the secrecy energy efficiency of user 1
in an interference channel scenario is higher than that of an
interference-free channel.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, interference channel,
power control, secrecy rate, secrecy energy efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadcasting information over the same frequency band in
wireless networks leads to interference among users. Even in
the systems where the spatial dimension is used to concentrate
the signal towards the intended destination, the destination may
receive interfering signals from other transmitters operating
in the same frequency band. Also, due to the expansion
and deployment of wireless services, the spectrum is getting
scarce [1]. As one possible solution, devices can share the
same spectrum which results in interference and degradation of
the signal quality. For instance, IEEE standards such as WiFi,
Zigbee and Bluetooth share the same frequency band named
the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band and they may
interference with each other [2]. Furthermore, the wireless
medium leaves the information vulnerable to unintended users
who can potentially decode the message which was meant for
other users. Throughout this paper, the words “wiretapper”, or
“eavesdropper” refer to the unintended users. While there are
higher layer cryptography techniques to secure the data, it is
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yet possible that a malicious agent breaks into the encryption
and gets access to the data [3]. By intelligently tuning the
system parameters using physical layer security techniques,
we can prevent the wiretappers from getting access to the
information and this way, and further improve the system
security along other techniques. Consequently, a specific rate
can be perfectly secured for the users to transmit their data, so
that the wiretapper is not able to decode the message. There are
efficient coding schemes which can achieve this rate. However,
this area is still in its infancy, and the research effort at the
moment is inclined in implementing practical codes [4].
Potentially, the interference can improve the secrecy rate
by introducing extra interference at the eavesdropper. The
possibility of secure transmission in a multi-user interference
channel using interference alignment and secrecy pre-coding
is investigated in [5]. The authors of [6] investigate the
secrecy rate in a two-user interference channel with an external
eavesdropper. They show structured transmission results in a
better secrecy rate compared to randomly generated Gaussian
codebooks. The authors of [7] study the secrecy capacity region
for a two-user interference channel in the presence of an
external eavesdropper. The users jointly design randomized
codebooks and inject noise along with data transmission to
improve the secrecy rate. The authors of [8] consider a user who
gets helping interference in order to increase its confidentiality
against an eavesdropper. The achievable secrecy rate for both
discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels is derived. A two-
user interference network with an unintended user is considered
in [?]. Depending on the channel conditions, bounds on the
transmission power of the interfering user is derived such that
a positive secrecy rate is sustained for the other user.
As an example of the interference channel, the effect of
interference on the secrecy rate is also investigated in cognitive
radio systems. In cognitive radios, secondary user transmits in
the primary user’s operating frequency band when it is not in
use. Stochastic geometry is used in [10] to analyze physical
layer secrecy in a multiple node cognitive radio network where
an eavesdropper is present. The secrecy outage probability
and the secrecy rate of the primary user is derived while
secondary user produces interference. The authors of [11]
maximize the secrecy rate for a multiple-antenna secondary user
in the presence of an external eavesdropper while considering
the quality of service (QoS) at the primary receiver. Similar
problems to maximize the secrecy rate through beamforming
design in cognitive radio are studied in [12]–[14].
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2A. Contributions and main results
In this work, we investigate the secrecy rate in a two-user
wireless interference network. Apart from the two users, one of
the idle users (unintended user) in this network is a potential
eavesdropper. Both nodes transmit in a way so that the secrecy
rate is maximized for the first user (user 1), and the second
user (user 2) maintains the QoS at its intended destination.
Only user 1 needs to establish a secure connection and to keep
its data secure. For example, in a network with ISM band users,
user 1 and user 2 can be WiFi and ZigBee transmitters. The
ZigBee can be used to send measurement data, which is one of
its applications, so its data may not be necessarily important to
the potential eavesdropper who is interested in WiFi messages.
We study the effect of interference from user 2 on the secrecy
rate of user 1 in two scenarios, namely altruistic and egoistic
scenarios. In the altruistic scenario, we jointly optimize the
transmission powers of both users in order to maximize the
secrecy rate of user 1, while maintaining the QoS at user 2’s
destination equal or above a specific threshold. The incentives
for user 2 to cooperate are twofold: 1) when positive secrecy
rate cannot be granted for user 1, it can enjoy an interference-
free transmission, 2) user 1 adjusts its transmission power to
maintain the QoS of user 2’s destination equal or above the
threshold. In the egoistic scenario, the users’ powers are still
jointly optimized. However, user 2 is selfish and only tries to
maintain the minimum QoS at the corresponding destination.
The contributions of our work are as follows. It is shown
that by appropriate control of user 1’s power, we can make
sure that the eavesdropper cannot decode the signal of user 2,
and thus cannot employ successive interference cancellation
(SIC). Also, it is shown that the transmitted power from user 2
has a crucial role in achieving a positive secrecy rate for
user 1. According to the channel conditions, we define the
proper power transmission for user 2 to maintain a positive
secrecy rate for user 1. We develop closed-form expressions to
implement joint optimal power control for both users in both
altruistic and egoistic scenarios. Finally, a new metric called
“secrecy energy efficiency” is defined, which is the secrecy
rate over the consumed power ratio. Using the new metric,
it is shown that the interference channel can outperform the
single-user channel for specific values of QoS requirements.
B. Related Work
Inner and outer bounds for the secrecy capacity regions in a
two-user interference channel with destinations as eavesdrop-
pers are investigated in [15]. They showed that the secrecy
capacity can be enhanced when one user transmits signal with
artificial noise. Later, [15] was extended to the case when
both users transmit artificial noise along with data in [16]. As
a result, they achieve a larger secrecy rate region when one
or both destinations are considered as eavesdropper. In [17],
an outer bound for secrecy capacity region is calculated for
a two-user one-sided interference channel. Outer bounds on
sum rate of a two-user Gaussian interference channel are
studied in [18] where message confidentiality is important
for users. Secrecy capacity region for a two-user MIMO
Gaussian interference channel is investigated in [19] where
each receiver is a potential eavesdropper. A two-user symmetric
linear deterministic interference channel is investigated in [20].
The achievable secrecy rate is investigated when interference
cancellation, cooperation, time sharing, and transmission of
random bits are used. It is shown that sharing random bits
achieves a better secrecy rate compared to sharing data bits.
A two-user MISO interference channel is considered in [21]
where beamforming is performed to maintain fair secrecy rate.
The work in [22] analyzes a two-user interference channel with
one-sided noisy feedback. Rate-equivocation region is derived
when the second user’s message needs to be kept secret. The
secrecy rate constrained to secrecy rate outage probability and
power is maximized by designing robust beamformer in [?]
where a transceiver pair and multiple eavesdroppers constitute
a network.
A multiple-user interference channel where only one user
as a potential eavesdropper receives interference is considered
in [24]. The sum secrecy rate is derived using nested lattice
codes. The authors in [25] consider a wireless network com-
prised of users, eavesdroppers and interfering nodes. It is shown
that interference can improve secrecy rate. A communication
network comprised of multiple-antenna base stations and single-
antenna users is considered in [26]. The total transmit power
is minimized while the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio
and equivocation rate for each user is satisfied.
In [27], a two-user network with one-sided-interference
where each destination is a potential eavesdropper for the
other one is studied. Using game theory, it is concluded that
depending on the objective of each pair, the equilibrium can
include or exclude the self-jamming strategy. The authors
of [28] analyze a two-user MISO Gaussian interference channel
where each destination is a potential eavesdropper. Game theory
is used to tackle the scenario where each user tries to maximize
the difference between its secrecy rate and the secrecy rate of
the other user. Beamformers under full and limited channel
information are designed at each transmitter to achieve this
goal.
A transceiver pair is studied in [29] where they try to increase
the secrecy rate using an external interferer when a passive
eavesdropper is present. The authors of [30] consider a user and
an eavesdropper where known interference which only degrades
the decoding ability at the eavesdropper is used to enhance
the secrecy capacity. The secrecy capacity and secrecy outage
capacity when closest interfering node and multiple interfering
nodes are separately employed to prevent eavesdropping is
studied in [31]. It is demonstrated that multiple interferes
method is superior to the closet interfering method. The exact
secure degrees of freedom for different types of Gaussian
wiretap channels are discussed in [32] where cooperative
jamming from helpers is used.
The equivocation-rate for a cognitive interference network
is considered in [33] where the primary receiver is a po-
tential eavesdropper and should not decode the secondary
message. A MISO transceiver along with multiple single-
antenna eavesdroppers are considered in [34]. The relationship
of the mentioned network with interference cognitive radio
network is used to design the transmit covariance matrix.
In [35], the secondary user causes interferes to both primary
3destination and eavesdropper. Primary user tries to maintain
its secrecy rate while the secondary aims to increase its rate.
The achievable pair rate for both users is derived.
C. Paper Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the network topology as well as the
signal model. The optimization problems for the altruistic
and egoistic scenarios are defined and analyzed in Section III
and Section IV, respectively. In Section VI, we evaluate
the optimal achievable secrecy rate and compare the two-
user wiretap interference channel scheme with the single-user
wiretap channel as the benchmark. Finally, the conclusions are
drawn in Section VII.
D. Notation
A
(1)
≷
(2)
0 means that A > 0 when the conditions of Case 1
hold and A < 0 when the conditions of Case 2 hold. | · |
represents the absolute value.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Signal Model
We consider a wireless interference network consisting of
two users denoted by U1 and U2, two destinations denoted by
D1 and D2, and one user as the eavesdropper denoted by E.
E is assumed to be passive during U1 and U2 transmission
and active outside the mentioned period. All nodes employ one
antenna for data communication. We denote by x1 and x2, the
messages which are sent over the same frequency band from U1
and U2 to D1 and D2, respectively. Sharing the same frequency
band by the users leads to cross-interference. While the users
send data, their signals are wiretapped by the eavesdropper, E.
The network setup is depicted in Fig. 1. Here, we consider a
scenario where E is only interested in the data sent by one
of the users, namely U1. As a result, x2 is considered as an
interfering signal at both D1 and E.
There are two ways in order to carry out the joint power
allocation: 1) users send their channel information to a fusion
center. At the fusion center, the optimal power values are
calculated and sent back to the users separately, 2) one of
the users sends its channel information to the other user
who calculates the optimal power values and sends the
optimal power value to the corresponding user. It can be
seen that the first approach consumes more time and number
of transmissions compared to the second one. Since U1 is
interested in sustaining a positive secrecy rate, it is fair if
this user pays the computational cost. Hence, we assume that
U2 sends the channels data to U1 and then U1 calculates the
optimal power values and sends back the related optimal power
value to U2. To perform channel estimation in the network,
one approach is that the destinations, including the unintended
user, send pilots and the transmitters are then able to estimate
the required CSIs. After estimating the channels, U2 forwards
the required CSIs to U1. U1 is then responsible to perform the
power control and inform U2 of the optimal power that it can
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Fig. 1: Two-user wireless interference network.
transmit. Note that in practice, it is often optimistic to have such
a model, as the eavesdroppers are often totally passive. But
here, we assume that the eavesdropper is momentarily active,
and thus its channel can be estimated and remains unchanged
for the optimal power control usage. One practical example of
such a scenario is when the eavesdropper is a known user in a
network such that U1’s messages should be kept confidential
from it.
The received signals at D1 and D2 are as follows
yD1 =
√
P1hU1,D1x1 +
√
P2hU2,D1x2 + nD1 , (1)
yD2 =
√
P2hU2,D2x2 +
√
P1hU1,D2x1 + nD2 , (2)
where P1 and P2 are the power of the transmitted signals by
U1 and U2, and hUi,Dj is the channel gain from each user to
the corresponding destination for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. The
transmission signal from the i-th user, and the additive white
Gaussian noise at the i-th destination are shown by
√
Pixi
and nDi for i = 1, 2, respectively. The random variables xi
and nDi are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
with xi ∼ CN (0, 1) and nDi ∼ CN (0, σ2n), respectively, where
CN denotes the complex normal random variable. In practice,
some signals follow Gaussian distribution such as the amplitude
of sample distributions of OFDM signal [36]. Using a Gaussian
distributed signal may not always be optimal, however, our
focus is on maximizing the secrecy rate by designing joint
optimal power allocation in a specific system model. The
wiretapped signal at E is
yE =
√
P1hU1,Ex1 +
√
P2hU2,Ex2 + nE , (3)
where hUi,E is the channel coefficient from the i-th user to
the eavesdropper for i = 1, 2, and nE is the additive white
Gaussian noise at the eavesdropper with the same distribution
as nDi . The additive white Gaussian noise at different receivers
are assumed to be mutually independent.
B. Secrecy rate of U1
In order to calculate the secrecy rate of U1, we need to first
find the rate of U1 without considering the secrecy, and then
the rate in which the eavesdropper wiretaps U1. In this paper,
we assume that U1 and U2 do not employ SIC. Therefore,
using (1) and (2), the rates for each user to the corresponding
4destination can be calculated as
IU1−D1 = log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2 + σ2n
)
, (4)
IU2−D2 = log2
(
1 +
P2|hU2,D2 |2
P1|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
)
. (5)
The eavesdropper simultaneously receives signals from U1
and U2 which are transmitting in the same frequency band.
Hence, the channel from users towards the eavesdropper can
be modeled by a multiple-access channel. Assume that the
transmission powers of U1 and U2 in a specific time slot
are P1 and P2. Then, considering that users employ Gaussian
codebooks and the eavesdropper tends to achieve the maximum
wiretapping rate from U1, the rate pairs achieved at the
eavesdropper are shown in Fig. 2 [37] which lie on the
line from point “A” to point “D”. To wiretap U1 with the
maximum achievable rate, the eavesdropper can employ the
SIC method [38]. Using SIC, the eavesdropper first decodes the
signal from U2 while considering U1’s signal as interference.
Then, considering the fact that the signal from U2 is decoded
and known, eavesdropper deducts U2’s signal from the received
signal and gets an interference-free signal from U1. In this
approach, the rate pairs on the line “CD” are achieved at the
eavesdropper if the transmission rate of U2, defined by R2, is
lower than the decode-able rate defined at point “G”. To prevent
the eavesdropper from achieving the maximal wiretapping rate,
U2’s transmission rate needs to be higher than the decode-able
rate at point “G”. Since users do not coordinate in order to
implement time-sharing or rate-splitting, U1’s signal cannot
be decoded with the rates which are on the line “DE”, and
thus it needs to decode U1 considering U2 as the interference
with a rate equal to the rate at point “E”. Therefore, to disable
the eavesdropper from performing SIC (i.e., achieving rate at
point “D”), the following condition needs to hold:
R2 =log2
(
1 +
P2|hU2,D2 |2
P1|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
)
> log2
(
1 +
P2|hU2,E |2
P1|hU1,E |2 + σ2n
)
. (6)
In (6), the left-hand side is the actual transmission rate of U2
which is equal to the decode-able rate at its destination, D2 . If
condition (6) is satisfied, the eavesdropper has to decode U1’s
signal by considering U2’s signal as interference. Interestingly,
satisfying condition (2) just needs U1 to adjust its transmission
power and is independent from P2. The condition on P1 to
satisfy (6) is derived as:
P1 >
A′′
B′′
if A′′ > 0, B′′ > 0, (7a)
P1 > 0 if A′′ < 0, B′′ > 0, (7b)
P1 <
A′′
B′′
if A′′ < 0, B′′ < 0, (7c)
P1 < 0 (not feasible) if A′′ > 0, B′′ < 0, (7d)
where A′′ = σ2n
(
|hU2,E |2 − |hU2,D2 |2
)
and B′′ =
|hU2,D2 |2|hU1,E |2 − |hU1,D2 |2|hU2,E |2. As we can see, the
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Fig. 2: Maximum achievable rate pairs of a two-user multiple-
access fading channel.
channel conditions define weather U1 can block the eaves-
dropper by adjusting its power. For the Cases 7a, 7b, and 7c,
the instantaneous wiretap rate from U1 toward E is obtained
by IU1−E = log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
P2|hU2,E|2+σ2n
)
, and thus the secrecy
rate of U1 in this case is as follows
CSU1 =IU1−D1 − IU1−E = log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2 + σ2n
)
− log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,E |2
P2|hU2,E |2 + σ2n
)
. (8)
For Case 7d, no power from U1 is capable of preventing the
eavesdropper from applying the SIC technique and deriving
an interference-free version of U1’s signal and thus IU1−E =
log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
σ2n
)
. This results in the following secrecy
rate
CSU2 =IU1−D1 − IU1−E = log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2 + σ2n
)
− log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,E |2
σ2n
)
. (9)
In the next two sections, we formulate and solve the underlying
problems so as to find the optimal P1 and P2.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION: ALTRUISTIC SCENARIO
In this section, we maximize the secrecy rate of U1 subject
to the peak power limits of the users as well as the quality of
service (QoS) at D2. If one of the cases 7a, 7b, or 7c holds,
using (8), the following secrecy rate optimization is solved:
max
P1,P2
CSU1
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 , P1
(7a)
≷
(7c)
ω, P2 ≤ Pmax2 , IU2−D2 ≥ β,
(10)
5where β is the minimum required data rate for U2 and ω = A
′′
B′′ .
In Case 7b, any P1 ensures that the eavesdropper cannot employ
SIC. Therefore, no additional constraint over P1 is necessary.
For Case 7d, using (9), the following secrecy rate optimization
problem should be solved
max
P1,P2
CSU2
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 , P2 ≤ Pmax2 , IU2−D2 ≥ β. (11)
We first solve (10) and then (11). By inserting (8) into (10),
we obtain
max
P1,P2
log2
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
P2|hU2,E|2+σ2n

s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 , P1
(7a)
≷
(7c)
ω, P2 ≤ Pmax2 ,
P2|hU2,D2 |2
P1|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
≥ γ, (12)
where γ is 2β − 1. Since log is a monotonic increasing function
of its argument, we can just maximize the argument and thus
we rewrite (12) as
max
P1,P2
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
P2|hU2,E|2+σ2n
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 , P1
(7a)
≷
(7c)
ω, P2 ≤ Pmax2 ,
P2|hU2,D2 |2
P1|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
≥ γ. (13)
Considering that the objective function is neither convex, nor
concave, solving problem (13) is difficult. As a result, we shall
adopt a two-step approach in order to solve (13). First, we
consider P2 to be fixed and derive the optimal value for P1,
and then we replace the obtained P1 in (13) and solve the
optimization problem for P2.
A. Optimizing P1 for a Given P2
For this case, (13) is reduced to
max
P1
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
P2|hU2,E|2+σ2n
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 , P1
(7a)
≷
(7c)
ω, P1 ≤ P2|hU2,D2 |
2 − γσ2n
γ|hU1,D2 |2
.
(14)
In order to solve (14), first, we find the range of P2 for which
the objective function in (14) is always positive, i.e., a positive
secrecy rate can be achieved. In the following theorem, we
outline the related bounds on P2 where the positive secrecy
rate is obtained.
Theorem 1: Assume an interference network similar to the
one mentioned in Fig. 1 along with the assumptions on power
limits and the QoS. In order to achieve a positive secrecy rate,
P2 should satisfy the following bounds:
P2 >
A
B
if A > 0, B > 0, (15a)
P2 > 0 if A < 0, B > 0, (15b)
P2 <
A
B
if A < 0, B < 0, (15c)
where A = σ2n
(
|hU1,E |2 − |hU1,D1 |2
)
and B =
|hU1,D1 |2|hU2,E |2 − |hU2,D1 |2|hU1,E |2. Further, for A >
0, B < 0, irrespective of the value of P2, no positive secrecy
rate can be obtained for U1.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
One immediate conclusion of Theorem 1 is given by the
following corollary which can be considered as the most
important result of this paper.
Corollary 3.1: In a wiretap interference channel as in Fig. 1,
where the goal is to obtain a positive secrecy rate for U1, the
possibility of achieving a positive secrecy rate is independent
from the value of P1, and depends on the value of P2 and the
conditions of the channels.
Now that we have defined the required conditions for P2 to
achieve a positive secrecy rate, we investigate the optimal value
of P1, denoted by P ?1 for a given P2. If we take the derivative
of the objective function in (14) with respect to P1, we see
that the conditions on P2 to have a monotonically increasing,
referred to as Case 1, or decreasing, referred to as Case 2,
are the same as the conditions to have a positive or negative
secrecy rate, respectively. These conditions are summarized as
follows
P2(1) >
A
B
, P2(2) <
A
B
if A > 0, B > 0,
P2(1) = ∅, P2(2) > 0 if A > 0, B < 0,
P2(1) > 0, P2(2) = ∅ if A < 0, B > 0,
P2(1) <
A
B
, P2(2) >
A
B
if A < 0, B < 0, (16)
where P2(1) refers to the required power in Case 1, P2(2) refers
to the required power in Case 2 and ∅ denotes the empty set.
According to Theorem 1, and the conditions in (16), the global
optimal values for P1 in Cases 1 and 2 are defined as
1) If the objective function in (10) is monotonically increas-
ing, then
P ?1 = min
{
χ,
P2|hU2,D2 |2 − γσ2n
γ|hU1,D2 |2
}
. (17)
where χ = Pmax1 for Cases 7a and 7b, χ =
min {Pmax1 , ω} for Case 7c.
2) If the objective function in (10) is monotonically decreas-
ing, then P ?1 = 0. This could also be concluded from the
fact that when a positive secrecy rate cannot be granted,
U1 should be turned off.
B. Optimizing P2 for a Given P1
We insert the P ?1 obtained in Subsection III-A into (14), and
try to obtain the optimal value for P2. First, we decompose
6the optimal answer of P1 in (17) into two different answers
as follows
P ?1 =

χ P2 ≥
γ
(
χ|hU1,D2 |2+σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2 ,
P2|hU2,D2 |2−γσ2n
γ|hU1,D2 |2 P2 <
γ
(
χ|hU1,D2 |2+σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2 .
(18)
Using Theorem 1 and according to the two resulting cases
in (18), we can break (13) into two problems in order to
optimize P2, respectively, as follows
max
P2
1 +
Pmax1 |hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
Pmax1 |hU1,E|2
P2|hU2,E|2+σ2n
s. t. P2 ≤ Pmax2 , P2 ≥
γ
(
χ|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2
= λ1,
P2
(15a)
≷
(15c)
σ2n
(
|hU1,E |2 − |hU1,D1 |2
)
|hU1,D1 |2|hU2,E |2 − |hU2,D1 |2|hU1,E |2
= ϕ1,
(19)
and
max
P2
1 +
(
P2|hU2,D2 |2−γσ2n
)|hU1,D1 |2
γ|hU1,D2 |2
(
P2|hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
)
1 +
(
P2|hU2,D2 |2−γσ2n
)|hU1,E|2
γ|hU1,D2 |2
(
P2|hU2,E|2+σ2n
)
s. t. P2 ≤ Pmax2 , P2 <
γ
(
χ|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2
= λ1,
P2 ≥ γσ
2
n
|hU2,D2 |2
= λ2,
P2
(15a)
≷
(15c)
σ2n
(
|hU1,E |2 − |hU1,D1 |2
)
|hU1,D1 |2|hU2,E |2 − |hU2,D1 |2|hU1,E |2
= ϕ1,
(20)
for A
(15a)
≷
(15c)
0 and B
(15a)
≷
(15c)
0. For the case A < 0 and B > 0 which
is represented by (15b), the last constraint in (19) and (20)
is removed from the problem since with any positive value
for P2, U1 can have a positive secrecy rate. Also for A > 0
and B < 0, the secrecy rate is simply zero since P1 = 0.
Furthermore, the numerator and denumerator in (20) have the
possibility to become less than unit and this leads to a negative
rate. The constraint in (20) which is placed one to the last,
ensures that the data and wiretap rates do not go below zero.
We discuss the feasibility conditions of (19) and (20) to
derive the feasibility domain, p2, in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2: The feasibility domain for the prob-
lems (19) and (20) denoted by p2 is defined as follows
1) Problem (19): For case (15a), we should have
max {λ1, supϕ1} ≤ Pmax2 which leads to p2 =
[max {λ1, supϕ1} , Pmax2 ]. For case (15c), we should
have min {inf ϕ1, Pmax2} ≥ λ1 which leads to p2 =
[λ1,min {inf ϕ1, Pmax2}].
2) Problem (20): For case (15a), we should have
max {supϕ1, λ2} ≤ min {inf λ1, Pmax2} which
leads to [max {supϕ1, λ2} ,min {inf λ1, Pmax2}].
For case (15c), we should have
min {inf ϕ1, inf λ1, Pmax2} ≥ λ2 which leads to
p2 = [min {inf ϕ1, inf λ1, Pmax2} , λ2].
Proof: The proof is straightforward, thus was omitted.
If both (19) and (20) are feasible at the same time, we select the
P ?2 and the corresponding secrecy rate from the problem which
results in a higher secrecy rate. Here, we provide a generic
closed-form solution depending on the channels’ conditions in
Theorems 2 and 3 for (19) and (20), respectively.
Theorem 2: Assume a = Pmax1 |hU1,D1 |2, b = |hU2,D1 |2,
c = Pmax1 |hU1,E |2, d = |hU2,E |2, C = b − d, D =
b
(
c+ σ2n
) − d (a+ σ2n), E = −BPmax1 = bc− ad, F =
cdσ2n − a
(
b
(
c+ σ2n
)− cd), G = APmax1σ2n = c − a, α =
min (inf ϕ1, Pmax2), and β = max {λ1, supϕ1}. Also, sup-
pose that (19) is feasible. Then, (19) is solved as follows:
1) If CD < 0
a) If A < 0 and E > 0
P ?2 = α (21)
b) If E < 0
P ?2 =
{
β A > 0
λ1 A < 0
(22)
2) If CD > 0
a) If A < 0, E > 0 and F < 0
P ?2 = arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ1,α}
Cs (23)
b) If E < 0 and F > 0
P ?2 =

P2C P2C ∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{β,Pmax2}
Cs A > 0, P2C /∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ1,Pmax2}
Cs A < 0, P2C /∈ p2
(24)
c) If E > 0, F > 0 and G < 0
P ?2 =

arg
P2
max
P2∈{P2C ,λ1,α}
Cs P2C ∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ1,α}
Cs P2C /∈ p2
(25)
d) If E < 0, F < 0 and G > 0
P ?2 =

arg
P2
max
P2∈{P2C ,β,Pmax2}
Cs P2C ∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{β,Pmax2}
Cs P2C /∈ p2
(26)
e) If E < 0, F < 0 and G < 0
P ?2 = λ1 (27)
where Cs is the objective function in (19), P2C =
−2bdGσ2n−
√
∆
2bdE , and ∆ = 4abcdCDσ
2
n.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 3: Assume e = |hU1,D1 |2, f = |hU2,D2 |2,
g = |hU1,D2 |2, h = |hU2,D1 |2, i = |hU1,E |2,
7j = |hU2,E |2, H = h − j, δ = min (inf λ1, Pmax2),
κ = min {inf λ1, inf ϕ1, Pmax2}, µ = max {supϕ1, λ2},
I = −fi+ ghγ − (hi+ gj) γ + e (f + jγ),
J = −gh2iγ (f + jγ) + e (f2i (−h+ j) + fgj2γ + ghj2γ2),
K = −gi (f + jγ) + e (fg + ghγ − hiγ + ijγ),
L = −ghi (f + jγ) + e (fhi+ fgj − fij + ghjγ).
Also, suppose that (20) is feasible. Then, (20) can be solved
as follows
1) If HI < 0
a) If J > 0
P ?2 =

δ A > 0, B > 0
δ A < 0, B > 0
κ A < 0, B < 0
(28)
b) If J < 0
P ?2 =

µ A > 0, B > 0
λ2 A < 0, B > 0
λ2 A < 0, B < 0
(29)
2) If HI > 0
a) If J > 0 and K < 0
P ?2 =

arg
P2
max
P2∈{µ,δ}
Cs A > 0, B > 0
arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ2,δ}
Cs A < 0, B > 0
arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ2,κ}
Cs A < 0, B < 0
(30)
b) If J < 0 and K > 0
P ?2 =

P2C P2C ∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{µ,δ}
Cs A > 0, B > 0, P2C /∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ2,δ}
Cs A < 0, B > 0, P2C /∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ2,κ}
Cs A < 0, B < 0, P2C /∈ p2
(31)
c) If J > 0, K > 0 and L < 0 or J < 0, K < 0 and
L > 0
P ?2 =

arg
P2
max
P2∈{P2C ,µ,δ}
Cs A > 0, B > 0, P2C ∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{P2C ,λ2,δ}
Cs A < 0, B > 0, P2C ∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{P2C ,λ2,κ}
Cs A < 0, B < 0, P2C ∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{µ,δ}
Cs A > 0, B > 0, P2C /∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ2,δ}
Cs A < 0, B > 0, P2C /∈ p2
arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ2,κ}
Cs A < 0, B < 0, P2C /∈ p2
(32)
d) If J > 0, K > 0 and L > 0
P ?2 =

δ A > 0, B > 0
δ A < 0, B > 0
κ A < 0, B < 0
(33)
e) If J < 0, K < 0 and L < 0
P ?2 =

µ A > 0, B > 0
λ2 A < 0, B > 0
λ2 A < 0, B < 0
(34)
where Cs is the objective function in (20) and P2C =
−2σ2nγL−
√
∆
2J , and ∆ = 4egiHI
(
σ2n
)4
γ (f + hγ) (f + jγ).
Proof: The proof can be obtained in the similar way to
that of Theorem 2.
For problem (11), the optimal solution of P1 is as (17) when
χ = Pmax1 . The closed-form solution for the P2 is given in
the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Assume a = |hU1,D1 |2, b = |hU2,D2 |2, c =
|hU1,D2 |2, d = |hU2,D1 |2, e = |hU1,E |2, A = b(a − e)σ +
d(−eγσ + cγσ), B = 2bde(aγσ − cγσ), C = −bceγσ2 +
a(bcγσ2 + dγσ(−eγσ + cγσ)), ψ = σ
2
n
(|hU1,D1 |2−|hU1,E|2)
|hU1,E|2|hU2,D1 |2 ,
λ1 =
γ
(
Pmax1 |hU1,D2 |2+σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2 , λ2 =
γσ2n
|hU2,D2 |2 , and ς =
min (Pmax2 , inf ψ, inf λ1). Then, optimal P2 is given as fol-
lows:
1) If A < 0
P ?2 = λ2 (35)
2) If A > 0
a) If C > 0 or B > 0 and C < 0
P ?2 =
P2C P2C ∈ p2arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ2,ψ}
Cs P2C /∈ p2 (36)
b) If B < 0 and C < 0
P ?2 = arg
P2
max
P2∈{λ2,ψ}
Cs (37)
where Cs is the secrecy rate, P2C = −B−
√
∆
2D , ∆ =
4Aabcdeγ(dγσ + bσ), D = −bde(ab + cdγ), and p2 is the
feasibility domain of the problem.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2, thus
was omitted.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION: EGOISTIC SCENARIO
In this section, we develop closed-form solutions for the
case when U2 is selfish from the view point of U1’s secrecy
rate, and adjusts its transmission power just to meet its QoS,
i.e., SINR=γ. Later, we compare this case with respect to the
altruistic scenario. If one of the Cases 7a, 7b, or 7c holds and
U2 is selfish, (14) can be written as
max
P1,P2
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
P2|hU2,E|2+σ2n
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 , P1
(7a)
≷
(7c)
ω, P2 ≤ Pmax2 ,
P2|hU2,D2 |2
P1|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
= γ.
(38)
8In Case 7b, any P1 ensures that the eavesdropper cannot employ
SIC, so no additional constraint over P1 is necessary. For
Case 7d, the problem is solved as follows
max
P1,P2
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
σ2n
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 , P2 ≤ Pmax2 ,
P2|hU2,D2 |2
P1|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
= γ.
(39)
We first solve (38) and then (39). Using the last constraint
in (38), we can directly derive the solution for P2 as P2 =
γ
(
P1|hU1,D2 |2+σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2 and replace it with the corresponding value.
Consequently, we can rewrite (38) as
max
P1
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
γ
(
P1|hU1,D2 |2+σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2 |
hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
γ
(
P1|hU1,D2 |2+σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2 |
hU2,E|2+σ2n
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 , P1
(7a)
≷
(7c)
ω, P1 ≤ Pmax2 |hU2,D2 |
2 − γσ2n
γ|hU1,D2 |2
.
(40)
Since the minimum value for the secrecy rate is zero, the
objective function in (40) should be greater or equal to one.
Proposition 4.1 gives the required condition on P1 in order
to have a positive secrecy rate. According to the channel
conditions, these constraints should be added to (40).
Proposition 4.1: In order for the objective function in (40)
to result in a non-negative secrecy rate, P1 should have the
following bounds:
P1 >
A′
B′
if A′ > 0, B′ > 0, (41a)
P1 > 0 if A′ < 0, B′ > 0, (41b)
P1 <
A′
B′
if A′ < 0, B′ < 0, (41c)
where A′ = ((1 + c) d− b (1 + e))σ2n, B′ = a (be− cd).
Also, for the case A′ > 0 and B′ < 0, irrespective of the
value for P2, no positive secrecy rate is possible for U1. The
values for b, c, d and e are defined in Theorem 5.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, thus
was omitted.
According to Proposition 4.1, we can rewrite (40) as
max
P1
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
γ
(
P1|hU1,D2 |2+σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2 |
hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
γ
(
P1|hU1,D2 |2+σ2n
)
|hU2,D2 |2 |
hU2,E|2+σ2n
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 , P1
(7a)
≷
(7c)
ω, P1
(41a)
R
(41c)
A′
B′
= ϕ3,
P1 ≤ Pmax2 |hU2,D2 |
2 − γσ2n
γ|hU1,D2 |2
= λ3. (42)
Assuming that (42) is feasible, we give a closed-form solution
for (42) in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5: Assuming a = |hU1,D2 |2, b = |hU1,D1 |2,
c = γ
|hU2,D1 |2
|hU2,D2 |2 , d = |hU1,E |
2, e = γ |hU2,E|
2
|hU2,D2 |2 , Q = c − e,
R = −(1 + c)d + a(c − e) + b(1 + e), S = −ac2d (1 + e) +
b
(
e (d+ ae) + c
(−d+ ae2)), T = −A′σ2n = −(1 + c)d+ b(1 +
e), U = B
′
a = be−cd, η = min {Pmax1 , λ3}, η′ = min {η, ω},
θ = min {Pmax1 , λ3, ϕ3}, and θ′ = min {θ, ω} (40) can be
solved as follows
1) If QR < 0
a) If S > 0, A′′ > 0, B′′ > 0, (or A′′ < 0, B′′ > 0)
P ?1 =

η Q > 0, R < 0
θ B′ < 0, Q < 0, R > 0
η B′ > 0, Q < 0, R > 0
(43)
b) If S > 0, A′′ < 0, B′′ < 0
P ?1 =

η′ Q > 0, R < 0
θ′ B′ < 0, Q < 0, R > 0
η′ B′ > 0, Q < 0, R > 0
(44)
c) If S < 0, A′′ > 0, B′′ > 0
P ?1 =
{
max {ϕ3, ω} B′ > 0, Q > 0, R < 0
ω Q < 0, R > 0
(45)
d) If S < 0, A′′ < 0, B′′ < 0 (or A′′ < 0, B′′ > 0)
P ?1 =
{
ϕ3 B
′ > 0, Q > 0, R < 0
0 Q < 0, R > 0
(46)
2) If QR > 0
a) If S > 0, T < 0 and B′ > 0
P ?1 =

arg
P1
max
P1∈{max{ϕ3,ω},η}
Cs A
′′ > 0, B′′ > 0
arg
P1
max
P1∈{ϕ3,η′}
Cs A
′′ < 0, B′′ < 0
arg
P1
max
P1∈{ϕ3,η}
Cs A
′′ < 0, B′′ > 0
(47)
9b) If S < 0, T > 0, A′′ > 0, B′′ > 0
P ?1 =

P1C P1C ∈ p1
arg
P1
max
P1∈{ω,η}
Cs P1C /∈ p1, B′ > 0
arg
P1
max
P1∈{ω,θ}
Cs P1C /∈ p1, B′ < 0
(48)
c) If S < 0 and T > 0, A′′ < 0, B′′ < 0
P ?1 =

P1C P1C ∈ p1
arg
P1
max
P1∈{0,η′}
Cs P1C /∈ p1, B′ > 0
arg
P1
max
P1∈{0,θ′}
Cs P1C /∈ p1, B′ < 0
(49)
d) If S < 0 and T > 0, A′′ < 0, B′′ > 0
P ?1 =

P1C P1C ∈ p1
arg
P1
max
P1∈{0,η}
Cs P1C /∈ p1, B′ > 0
arg
P1
max
P1∈{0,θ}
Cs P1C /∈ p1, B′ < 0
(50)
e) If S > 0, T > 0, U < 0 and A′′ > 0, B′′ > 0
P ?1 =

arg
P1
max
P1∈{P1C ,ω,θ}
Cs P1C ∈ p1
arg
P1
max
P1∈{ω,θ}
Cs P1C /∈ p1
(51)
f) If S > 0, T > 0, U < 0 and A′′ < 0, B′′ < 0
P ?1 =

arg
P1
max
P1∈{P1C ,0,θ′}
Cs P1C ∈ p1
arg
P1
max
P1∈{0,θ′}
Cs P1C /∈ p1
(52)
g) If S > 0, T > 0, U < 0 and A′′ < 0, B′′ > 0
P ?1 =

arg
P1
max
P1∈{P1C ,0,θ}
Cs P1C ∈ p1
arg
P1
max
P1∈{0,θ}
Cs P1C /∈ p1
(53)
h) If S < 0, T < 0, U > 0, A′′ > 0, B′′ > 0 (or
A′′ < 0, B′′ > 0)
P ?1 =

arg
P1
max
P1∈{P1C ,max{ϕ3,ω},η}
Cs P1C ∈ p1
arg
P1
max
P1∈{max{ϕ3,ω},η}
Cs P1C /∈ p1
(54)
i) If S < 0, T < 0, U > 0 and A′′ < 0, B′′ < 0
P ?1 =

arg
P1
max
P1∈{P1C ,ϕ3,η′}
Cs P1C ∈ p1
arg
P1
max
P1∈{ϕ3,η′}
Cs P1C /∈ p1
(55)
j) If S > 0, T > 0 and U > 0
P ?1 =

η A′′ > 0, B′′ > 0
η A′′ < 0, B′′ > 0
η′ A′′ < 0, B′′ < 0
(56)
where P1C =
−2a(1+c)(1+e)Uσ2n−
√
∆
2aS and ∆ =
4abdQR
(
σ2n
)4
(1 + c) (1 + e).
Proof: The proof can be obtained in the similar way to
that of Theorem 2.
For problem (39), the closed-form solution for P1 is given in
the following theorem.
Theorem 6: Assume f = |hU1,D1 |2, g = |hU1,D2 |2, h =
|hU2,D1 |2, i = |hU2,D2 |2, j = |hU1,E |2, E = ad+ bcγ− e(d+
cγ), F = ad− e(d+ cγ), and τ = min (Pmax2 , inf ρ). Then,
optimal P1 is as follows:
1) If E < 0
P ?2 = 0 (57)
2) If E > 0
a) If F > 0
P ?2 =
P2C P2C ∈ p2arg
P2
max
P2∈{0,τ}
Cs P2C /∈ p2 (58)
b) If F < 0
P ?2 = arg
P2
max
P2∈{0,τ}
Cs (59)
where P2C = −G−
√
∆
2H , ∆ = 4Eabcdeγ(d + cγ)σ
2,
G = −2bceγ(d + cγ)σ, H = −bceγ(ad + bcγ), ρ =
σ2n
(|hU1,D1 |2−|hU1,E|2)|hU2,D2 |2
γ|hU1,E|2|hU2,D1 |2|hU1,D2 |2 −
σ2n
|hU1,D2 |2 , and p2 is the
feasibility domain of the problem.
Proof: The proof can be obtained in the similar way to
that of Theorem 2.
V. SECRECY ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Before going to Section VI, we define a metric in order to
investigate the energy efficiency of the considered scenario. We
define the secrecy energy efficiency, ηSEE , as the maximum
secrecy rate obtained from the objective of (9), namely
Ψ, to the optimal consumed power of U1, P ?1 , ratio as
ηSEE =
max
P1
Ψ
P?1
. Similarly, in the case we have only one
transceiver pair and an eavesdropper with no interfering user,
the secrecy energy efficiency metric, ηSEE , can be defined as
ηSEEsu =
log((σ2n+P
?|hU,D|2)/(σ2n+P?|hU,E |2))
P? , where P is the
transmission power, and P ? is the optimal transmission power
obtained from the optimization problem in the nominator. When
the condition |hU,D|2 > |hU,E |2 holds, the optimum consumed
power in the single-user case is Pmax. In contrast, as we shall
see in Section VI, the optimal power consumed by U1 in the
interference channel is considerably lower than Pmax. Hence,
as shall be shown in Section VI, in a wide range of powers,
the interference network outperforms the single-user network
in terms of secrecy energy efficiency.
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VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present different scenarios as numerical
examples to further clarify the derived results. As a benchmark,
we consider a single-user scenario where only one user is
present in the environment and there is no second user to
produce interference [39]. Then, we compare this benchmark
with our system model. Here, we refer to the altruistic
and egoistic scenarios as interference channel modes. In all
simulation scenarios, we assume that the noise power is equal
to one, i.e., σ2n = 1. All the channel coefficients are modeled as
i.i.d. complex normal random variables with real and imaginary
parts being as N (0, 1). The channel coefficients are normalized
to have a unit variance as CN (0, 1).
For the first scenario, we consider the effect of the users’
power limits, Pmax1 and Pmax2 , on the average secrecy rate
as shown in Fig. 3 for SINR = 1 at U2’s destination. By
observing the results in Fig. 3, we can draw the following
conclusions for both altruistic and egoistic scenarios:
1) Average secrecy rate of U1 increases as Pmax1 or Pmax2
increases.
2) Increasing Pmax1 is more effective on improving the
average secrecy rate rather than increasing Pmax2 . The
reason is that increasing U2’s power creates more
interference to both U1 and E.
3) The average secrecy rate of U1 is lower in the egoistic
scenario since U2 does not change its transmitted power
in favor of U1, and only adjusts it according to the
required QoS at D2. Also, by comparing Fig. 4 and
Fig. 5, it can be seen that U2 consumes less power in
the egoistic scenario. When the Cases (15a) and (15b)
of Theorem 1 are true, U2 can improve the secrecy rate
by providing more power in the altruistic scenario.
The average optimal powers consumed by U1 and U2 are
shown in Fig. 4 for the altruistic scenario. Following points
are implied by Fig. 4 as:
1) In contrast to the single-user case where the maximum
power consumption is optimum when the data link is
stronger than the wiretap link, average optimal powers
expended by users in the interference channel modes
are considerably less than the available quantity. So, the
optimum power control in the interference channel leads
to enormous power saving.
2) As Pmax1 increases, U2 consumes more power. A higher
power transmission from U1 produces more interference
on D2. This makes U2 to choose higher transmission
power in order to maintain the QoS at D2.
3) As Pmax2 increases, U1 utilizes more power. A higher
available power for U2 enables it to compensate a higher
interference from U1, so U1 transmits with a higher
power to increase the secrecy rate.
4) Depending on the maximum available power to the users,
the optimal consumed power by one user can be higher
or lower than the power consumed by the other user.
Consumed powers by U1 and U2 for the egoistic scenario
are illustrated in Fig. 5. As we can see, the power consumption
pattern is similar to the altruistic scenario as in Fig. 4. By
comparing Fig. 5 with Fig. 4, it is noticed that the power
Fig. 3: Average secrecy rate versus the users’ maximum
available powers in altruistic and egoistic scenarios.
Fig. 4: Average optimal power consumed by the users versus
their maximum available powers in altruistic scenario.
consumed by the users in the altruistic scenario is higher than
the egoistic scenario.
Average excess SINR provided by U2 at D2 in the altruistic
scenario is shown in Fig. 6 for different values of the required
QoS, γth. Following messages are conveyed by Fig. 6 as:
1) By increasing Pmax1 for a fixed Pmax2 , the excess SINR
provided at D2 drops due to increased interference from
U1’s transmission.
2) Increasing Pmax2 for a fixed Pmax1 leads to a higher
excess SINR at D2.
The average secrecy rate comparison among the single-user
benchmark and the interference channel modes is presented
in Fig. 7 with respect to the maximum available power of U1.
Following conclusions can be made according to Fig. 7:
1) Increasing Pmax2 also enhances the average secrecy rate
but much less compared to increasing the Pmax1 , because
U2 induces interference on both D1 and E.
2) The secrecy rate in the egoistic scenario is always lower
than the one in the altruistic scenario. In the egoistic
11
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Fig. 6: Average excess QoS provided at D2 versus users’
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5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
P
max
1
A
ve
ra
ge
 s
ec
re
cy
 ra
te
 (b
/s/
Hz
)
 
 
Single−user
γth=0.05, Pmax
2
=20
γth=0.3, Pmax
2
=20
γth=0.3, Pmax
2
=30
γth=0.3, Pmax
2
=10
Altruistic
Egoistic
Fig. 7: Average secrecy rate versus U1’s maximum available
power.
scenario, U2 consumes power to only fulfil the QoS at
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P
max
2
A
ve
ra
ge
 s
ec
re
cy
 s
at
e 
(b
/s/
Hz
)
 
 
SU, P
max
1
=20
γth=0.05, Pmax
1
=20
γth=0.3, Pmax
1
=20
γth=0.3, Pmax
1
=30
γth=0.3, Pmax
1
=10
Egoistic
SU: Single−user
Altruistic
Fig. 8: Average secrecy rate versus U2’s maximum available
power.
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
P
max
1
A
ve
ra
ge
 s
ec
re
cy
 ra
te
 to
 p
ow
er
 ra
tio
 (b
it/s
/H
z/p
ow
er
 un
it)
 
 
Single−user
γth=1, Egoistic
γth=1, Altruistic
γth=15, Egoistic
γth=15, Altruistic
Fig. 9: Average secrecy energy efficiency versus U1’s maximum
available power.
D2. As a result, U2 does not increase its transmission
power to produce interference on E when the Cases (15a)
and (15b) of Theorem 1 hold. However, in the altruistic
scenario, U2 can change its transmission power in favor
of U1 when it becomes necessary.
A similar comparison as in Fig. 7 is displayed in Fig. 8
with respect to the maximum available power of U2. The
Statements 1 and 2 of Fig. 7 also hold for Fig. 8. As we
see in Fig. 8, increasing Pmax2 also increases the average
secrecy rate. By increasing Pmax2 , U2 gets a higher ability to
suppress the interference coming from U1 as well as causing
more interference on E when the Cases (15a) and (15b) of
Theorem 1 hold. As a result, U1 can transmit with a higher
power and enhance the secrecy rate.
As we can see from Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, the average secrecy
rate in the interference channel modes is lower than its value in
the single-user case. However, we should note that the power
consumed in the interference channel modes is considerably
lower than the single-user case. To make a fair comparison, we
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use the “secrecy energy efficiency” metric defined in Section V
to compare the secrecy rates of the interference channel modes
and the single-user benchmark. This metric is derived for
different values of γth in Fig. 9. According to graphs in Fig. 9,
we can make the following conclusions:
1) The secrecy energy efficiency is higher for the inter-
ference channel modes in a considerable range of γth
and Pmax1 . If we consider a specific available power for
U1, the acquired secrecy rate in the interference channel
modes becomes higher than the one achieved in the
single-user case.
2) As the maximum available power to U1 increases, the
secrecy energy efficiency falls faster for the cases with
lower γth.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied the effect of interference on improving the
secrecy rate in a two-user wireless interference network with
input signals following Gaussian distribution. We developed
channel dependent expressions for both altruistic and egoistic
scenarios to define the proper range of transmission power
for the interfering user, namely user 2, in order to sustain a
positive secrecy rate for the other user, namely user 1. Closed-
form solutions were obtained in order to perform joint optimal
power control for both users in the altruistic and egoistic
scenarios. It was shown that by decreasing the required QoS at
user 2’s destination, the secrecy rate in the interference channel
improves and gets closer to the single-user case.
Moreover, to fairly compare our scheme with the benchmark,
the ratio of the secrecy rate over the optimal consumed power
by user 1 was introduced as a new metric called “secrecy energy
efficiency”, in order to take into account both the secrecy rate
and the consumed power. It was shown that in comparison
with the single-user case, the secrecy energy efficiency is
considerably higher in the interference channel for a wide
range of QoS at user 2’s destination.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For the objective function in (12) to be positive, the following
condition must hold
log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2 + σ2n
)
− log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,E |2
P2|hU2,E |2 + σ2n
)
> 0
⇒ P1|hU1,D1 |
2
P2|hU2,D1 |2 + σ2n
>
P1|hU1,E |2
P2|hU2,E |2 + σ2n
⇒
P2 >
σ2n
(|hU1,E|2−|hU1,D1 |2)
B B > 0
P2 <
σ2n
(|hU1,E|2−|hU1,D1 |2)
B B < 0
(60)
where B = |hU1,D1 |2|hU2,E |2 − |hU2,D1 |2|hU1,E |2.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In order to find the optimal P2 for (19), we analyze the deriva-
tive of the objective function in (19). The derivative is defined
at the top of next page in (61) where a = Pmax1 |hU1,D1 |2,
b = |hU2,D1 |2, c = Pmax1 |hU1,E |2, and d = |hU2,E |2.
According to the sign of the derivative, the optimal P2 can
be found. The denumerator in (61) is already positive, so the
sign of (61) directly depends on the sign of the numerator. The
numerator is a quadratic equation. According to the sign of the
discriminant of the quadratic equation [40, Section 5.1], denoted
by ∆ = 4abcdσ2n (b− d)
[−d (a+ σ2n)+ b (c+ σ2n)], the
status of the roots can be defined. The sign of the discriminant
can be defined as
1) If (b− d) [−d (a+ σ2n)+ b (c+ σ2n)] < 0, ∆ < 0.
2) If (b− d) [−d (a+ σ2n)+ b (c+ σ2n)] > 0, ∆ > 0.
Using the sign of ∆ as well as the sign of the P2’s coefficients
in the quadratic equation which we denote them from highest
order to constant as a′, b′ and c′ in (61), the sign of the
derivative can be defined and consequently the optimal value
for P2, P ?2 , can be found as follows:
1) If ∆ < 0, no root exists for the numerator in (61) leading
to the following cases:
a) a′ > 0, then the derivative is strictly positive, as
shown in Fig. 10a, and is monotonically increasing,
so the highest value in the feasible set is the P ?2 .
b) a′ < 0, then the derivative is strictly negative, as
shown in Fig. 10b, and is monotonically decreasing,
so the lowest possible value in the feasible set is
the P ?2 .
2) If ∆ > 0, there exist two roots (two critical points for
the objective function in (19)) for the derivative leading
to the following cases:
a) Only one of the roots is positive. This happens
when the product of the roots [40, Section 5.1], c
′
a′ ,
is negative in the following cases:
i) a′ > 0 and c′ < 0, as shown in Fig. 10c. In this
case, the critical point is a minimum, so one of
the vertices of the feasible domain is the P ?2 .
ii) a′ < 0 and c′ > 0, as shown in Fig. 10d. For
this case, the critical point is a maximum and
if falls into the feasibility domain of P2, it is
the P ?2 . Otherwise, one of the vertices of the
feasible domain is the P ?2 .
b) Both of the roots are positive. This happens when
both the product, c
′
a′ , and the sum [40, Section 5.1],
− b′a′ , of the roots are positive in two following
conditions:
i) a′ > 0, c′ > 0 and b′ < 0, as shown in Fig. 10e.
For the first case, the derivative is first positive,
then negative and then positive, respectively,
meaning that the first root results in a maximum
and the second root results in a minimum. If
the smaller root falls in the feasibility domain
of P2, then by comparing it with the vertices
of the feasibility domain, P ?2 is found. If the
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∂OF
∂P2
=
bd (bc− ad)P 22 + 2b (−a+ c) dσ2nP2 + σ2n
(
cdσ2n − a
(−cd+ b (c+ σ2n)))
(σ2n + bP2)
2
(c+ σ2n + dP2)
2 (61)
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derivative.
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(d) Positive and negative
derivative.
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Fig. 10: Different cases for the sign of the derivative in (61).
smaller root is not in the feasibility domain of
P2, the optimal value of P2 is at one of the
vertices of the feasibility domain.
ii) a′ < 0, c′ < 0 and b′ > 0, as shown in Fig. 10f.
In this case, we find out that the larger root
is a maximum. If the larger root falls in the
feasibility domain of P2, then by comparing it
to the vertices of the feasibility domain of P2,
we can find the P ?2 . If the larger root is not
in the feasibility domain of P2, we should find
the optimal value of P2 in the vertices of the
feasibility domain.
c) Both of the roots are negative. This happens when
the product of the roots, c
′
a′ , is positive and the
sum of the roots, − b′a′ , is negative in two following
conditions:
i) a′ > 0, c′ > 0 and b′ > 0, as shown in Fig. 10g.
Since the transmission power is always positive,
the critical points cannot be the answer to P ?2 .
For the first case, the derivative is first positive,
then negative and then positive, respectively. As
a result, the secrecy rate will be increasing after
P2 > 0. So, P ?2 is the maximum possible value
of P2 inside the feasibility set.
ii) a′ < 0, c′ < 0 and b′ < 0, as shown in
Fig. 10h. As in Case 2(c)i, the critical points
cannot be the answer to P ?2 . For the first case,
the derivative is first negative, then positive
and then negative, respectively. So, the secrecy
rate is decreasing after P2 > 0. Hence, P ?2 is
the minimum possible value of P2 inside the
feasibility set.
In deriving the above closed-form optimal solutions, we have
considered all the possible cases of discriminant sign, ∆, and
the coefficients of the quadratic equation, a′, b′, and c′. In
each case, we have calculated all the critical points and if
applicable, these critical points are compared with the vertices
of the domain to make sure that the derived power value is
globally optimum. Hence, the optimal solutions presented in
Appendix B are global optimum.
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